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British General Archibald Campbell could not have been 
happy. Besieged on all sides in the South by Patriot and Spanish 
forces, he mustered little support from his native allies, the 
Creek Indians. When he engaged his enemy, few Creeks were 
present for battle. With the American Revolution rapidly 
drawing to a close, Campbell experienced the ambivalence of 
the Creek nation in late 1781. This was especially frustrating 
and disappointing for British goals of keeping at least the 
southernmost colonies. That England was not able to ever fully 
recruit what James Adair referred to as "the most powerful 
Indian nation we are acquainted with on this continent" may 
have lost them South Carolina, Georgia, and East and West 
Florida. As John Alden later wrote, "It was a happy circumstance 
for the Southern states, suffering as they did from Cherokee 
onslaughts that the belligerent Creeks never threw their full 
weight into the war on the Southern frontier."l 
Certainly the presence of thousands of powerful, 
experienced warriors like the Creeks would have been a boon 
to either side during the confrontation. However, nothing of the 
sort ever materialized. Instead, roving bands of war parties 
attacking Whig and Tory alike typified the Creek experience 
during the American Revolution. Due to factors both internal 
1 Samuel Cole Williams, ed., Adair's History of the American 
Indians Oohnson City: The Watauga Press, 1930), 275; John 
Richard Alden, The South in the Revolution, 1763-1789 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 274. 
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and external, the Creek nation experienced a struggle for 
neutrality during the years of 1 776-1 783 that would lay the 
frame work for their own civil war just thirty years after the end 
of the colonial revolt. This paper seeks to analyze those very 
causes that must have mystified both Patriot and British leaders 
alike. 
No concept is more readily misunderstood by readers 
than the idea of a Creek "nation." Historians have long used the 
word to describe the Creek, or more properly, Muskogee 
people. It was an attempt to explain the cultural bond that held 
the group together. However, nationhood, as commonly 
understood today, implies a certain unification along political 
boundaries and ideals that simply did not exist within Creek 
society. Therefore, when considering the Creek political 
structure, the term "confederacy" is probably best applied. The 
term "nation" is still applicable when speaking towards the 
group's cultural bonds. 
The Creek derived their common name from the many 
streams, rivers and swamps they inhabited in much of present 
day Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. In 1 775, Adair calculated 
that Creek lands consisted of approximately 50 towns, and 
consisted of "about 3500 men fit to bear arms." Recent 
historical demographic studies have placed the entire Creek 
population at a number approximating 14,000.2 According to 
2 Joshua Piker, "Colonists and Creeks: Rethinking the Pre-
Revolutionary Southern Backcountry," The journal of Southern 
History 70, No. 3 (August 2004): 511; Williams, Adair's History, 
274; Peter H. Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial 
South: An Overview of Race and Region, 1685-1790," in 
Powhatan's Mantle, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood 
and Tom Hatley (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006). 
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their own history, the Creeks had arrived from a location far to 
the west, conquered the local tribes, and adopted them into 
their society. Naturalist Bernard Romans noted the mixture of 
races, stating the Creeks: 
were a mixture of the remains of the Cawittas, 
Talepoosas, Coosas, Apalachias, Conshacs or 
Coosades, Oakmulgis, Oconis, Okchoys, 
Alibamons, Natchez, Weetumkus, Pakanas, 
Taensas, Chacsihoomas, Abekas and some other 
tribes whose names I do not recollect ... call 
themselves Muscokees and are at present known 
to us by the general name of Creeks, and divided 
into upper and lower Creeks; also those they call 
allies and are a colony from the others living far 
south in East Florida.3 
It was difficult to achieve political unity within the 
confederacy due to the competing and sometimes conflicting 
loyalties Creeks had with townships and family clans. The 
confederation was split almost equally in two, with its people 
being known as either "Upper" or "Lower" Creeks. The Upper 
Creeks inhabited the valleys of the Coosa, Tallapoosa, and 
Alabama rivers in central Alabama, situated along a trade route 
from Charles Town. To the south and east resided the Lower 
Creeks, living amongst the Chattahoochee, Flint, and Ocmulgee 
rivers in Georgia.4 
3 Louis De Vorsey, Jr., The Indian Boundary in the Southern 
Colonies, 1763-1775 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1 966), 21 . 
4 Wood, Powhatan's Mantle, 83. 
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The Creek confederation was united by the notion of 
clans. Interwoven between Upper and Lower towns, members of 
the society linked themselves to others through these extended 
families. A Creek warrior, for instance, did not identify himself 
as "Creek." Rather, he identified himself as part of the Bear clan 
or Wind clan. When war parties went on raids, they did not do 
so because of Creek allegiance; they did so as members of a 
particular clan. Alexander McGillivray, later a very strong pro-
British leader, was able to establish himself because of his 
mother's membership in the Wind clan, one of the most 
powerful within the confederacy.s 
Clans and townships shared a common delineation: their 
stance on war and peace. Known as either "red" or "white," red 
towns and clans were more aggressive towards foes, while 
white towns and clans were known to be more peaceful, though 
they too participated in war. This division created hostility 
within the Creek world. According to Claudio Saunt, "The 
tension between red and white towns and between and even 
within individuals made alliances conditional and negotiable 
and made persuasion the root of power."6 
Further complicating matters for anyone seeking Creek 
allegiance was the lack of centralized leadership. Alexander 
McGillivray may have proclaimed himself to be head of the 
Creek nation before his death in 1 793, but in 1 775 the people 
s John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 2nd ed. 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 5, 62; 
Charles M. Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 194-195. 
6 Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property_ Power and 
the Transformation of the Creek Indians, I 733-1816 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 22. 
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of the swamps had no supreme ruler. Instead, towns were led 
by chiefs, called "micos." These rulers did not have the power 
to compel any of their followers to do anything. A mico only 
had the power to persuade his fellow people along a certain 
path, never holding absolute authority. Towns had complete 
authority to act independently of one another. This extreme 
democratization infuriated those dealing with them, notably 
James Oglethorpe, head of the colony of Georgia in the 1 730s, 
who exclaimed: 
... there is no coercive power in any of their nations; their 
kings can do no more than persuade .... All the power 
they had is no more than to call their old men and 
captains together and to propound to them the 
measures they think proper; and after they have done 
speaking, all the others have liberty to give their 
opinions also; and they reason together with great 
temper and modesty till they have brought each other 
into some unanimous resolution." 7 
Politically, the Creeks were unmatched in the South. During the 
Seven Years' War, the Creeks played the French, Spanish and 
English off each other to maintain a strong system of trade and 
support. Never really choosing any side over another, individual 
Creeks would favor certain parties and work actively for the 
benefit of their friends. Creek-on-Creek fighting did not occur, 
except for the gladiatorial sparring of words in town talks. 
The beginning of the American Revolution found the 
Creek confederacy in an uneasy position. Their grounds were 
under heavy assault by both white hunters and land 
speculators. Colonists did little to endear themselves to the 
native population, especially in the case of one Thomas Fee, a 
7 Ibid., 26.; Williams, Adair's History, 459-460. 
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white settler who murdered the popular Mad Turkey and 
escaped prosecution.s 
Overhunting by the settlers on traditional grounds 
(especially those of the Lower Creeks) devastated the 
populations of whitetail deer. As the herd numbers diminished, 
native hunters were forced to target smaller deer. Not only 
important for means of subsistence, the deer skin trade was 
vital to Creek livelihood. Creek hunters traded the deerskins for 
rifles, ammunition, blankets and rum. As elsewhere, American 
Indians by the late eighteenth century were reliant upon foreign 
goods to sustain their lifestyle. They did not have the ability to 
manufacture or repair firearms, leaving them at mercy of 
colonial traders. Without white munitions, Creek men were 
unable to provide for their families during the winter months. 
Therefore, many Creek men operated at a deficit, indebting 
themselves to traders prior to the winter hunting season before 
repaying them in the spring. The deerskin to goods exchange 
rate was eroding, and forced Creek members into huge debts 
that would eventually be repaid in the form of land cessions. 
The continual land grabbing by speculators and faltering Creek 
economy led some, like The Mortar (Yahatastanage), to become 
openly hostile towards the Colonial newcomers.9 
The Creeks were also engaged in yet another war with 
the Choctaws, their longtime rivals to the west. While Adair 
claimed the Muskogee were "an over-match for the numerous 
and fickle Choktah," the war took its toll on the Creek nation, 
s New-York}ournal, May 12, 1774; Dunlap's Pennsylvania 
Packet, May 30, 1774. 
9 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek 
Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (Li nco In: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 153, 161. 
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depriving it of many capable warriors and leaders, especially 
The Mortar, who was killed seeking help from the Spanish in 
1774.10 
Heeding James Adair's warning that there was "no sure 
way to fight them, but in carrying the war into the bowels of 
their own country, by a superior body of the provincial troops, 
mixed with regulars," both British and Colonial diplomats 
initially asked the Creeks to stay out of the war. The 
Continental Congress on july 13, 1775, delivered a talk to the 
Six Nations Iroquois meant for all native peoples, comparing 
the war to a fight between father and son. They asked that 
Indian nations not attack the British and "keep the hatchet 
buried deep." At the same time, the Americans sought to 
explain their position and gain sympathy with Indians by 
stating that King George's counselors were "proud and wicked 
men," who had persuaded the king to break his bond with the 
colonies and were stealing from the colonists. Preying on 
Indian fears of land loss, the Americans questioned, "If the 
king's troops take away our property, and destroy us who are 
of the same blood with themselves, what can you, who are 
Indians, expect from them afterwards?"11 
The requests for neutrality did not last long. In a letter 
dated September 12, 1775, British General Thomas Gates called 
upon Superintendent of Southern Indian Affairs John Stuart to 
10 Williams, Adair's History, 286; The New- York Gazette, January 
23, 1775. 
11 Ibid., 301.; "Continental Congress to the Indian Nations 
about the Conflict with the British", July 13, 1775, Early 
American Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789: Volume 
XIV North and South Carolina Treaties, 1756-1775. 
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employ Indians to the crown's advantage. This was a task 
Stuart was loathe to undertake.l2 
By all accounts, Scottish Stuart was a "remarkable man 
and a worthy and loyal servant of the crown." He owed years of 
experience with southern Indians to fighting in the Anglo-
Cherokee war and had been a prisoner marked for death before 
being pardoned by Cherokee Chief Attakullakulla (Little 
Carpenter). He returned from his imprisonment with much 
prestige, owing to both his wartime heroics and his time spent 
with the Cherokee. What set him apart from his contemporaries 
was his understanding of American Indian ways of life and he 
spent much of his time preventing red/white hostilities in the 
frontier. He also understood that complete peace in Indian 
country was unattainable, since Indian boys were not 
considered men until they had taken a scalp. To wit, he steered 
hostilities away from white settlers and stunted pan-Indian 
sentiment by fomenting grievances between the Six Nation 
Iroquois, Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw peoples, 
specifically the ongoing Choctaw-Creek war. He grew 
disillusioned of land cessions by Indians to private 
organizations and actively opposed the Cherokee-Creek Land 
Cession of 1 773. He feared that a precedent of private 
acquisitions with the Indians would make frontier government 
powerless, stating that traders would have the power "to 
counteract the Measures of Government whenever they may 
12 "General Thomas Gage to Superintendent Stuart with 
Authorization to Use Indians Against American Rebels", 
September 12, 1775, Early American Documents: Treaties and 
Laws, 160 7 -I 789: Volume XIV North and South Carolina 
Treaties, 1756-1775. 
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happen to clash with their particular Views & Interest, to the 
total Subversion of all Order and Regularity."n 
Stuart, along with his deputy David Taitt, was able to 
build a lasting friendship with a particularly influential Creek 
headman named Emistiseguo, from the Upper town of Little 
Tallassee. Emistiseguo was able to rally the Upper towns to the 
side of the British, but was continually rebuffed by the Lower 
Creeks due to the work of Patriot merchant George Galphin. 
Like Stuart, Galphin had spent much time in Indian country, 
particularly the Lower Creek town of Coweta, a red town known 
for its cunning warriors. Likely the earliest merchant in Creek 
territory, Galphin was an intelligent man who had made a 
considerable fortune in the backcountry. He made many friends 
among the Creeks, most importantly Handsome Fellow of 
Okfuskee, an Upper town that was decisive in keeping the 
northern bands inactive for the majority of the war. He differed 
from Stuart in that he promoted neutrality. Galphin similarly 
hated the frontier violence but thought that frontier traders 
could do a better job limiting it. He believed the traders knew 
the Indians best and that generous gifts would go a long way in 
ending hostilities. Writing to his friend the Young Lieutenant in 
1774, he stated: "I am doing all that is in my Power to keep 
Peace here with your People and the White People and I hope 
you will do the same there .... You never shall be poor as long 
as I live."l4 
13 john Richard Alden, A History of the South Ill: The South in 
the Revolution 1763-1789 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1957), 124; J. Russell Snapp, john Stuart and 
the Struggle for Empire on the Southern Frontier(Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 121-122. 
14 Williams, Adair's History, 288; Snapp, john Stuart, 142-143. 
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The Lower Creeks settled at first onto a stance of 
neutrality. Writing to John Stuart in late September, 1 775, 
headmen from Coweta, Cussita, and two other towns declared 
their intentions: 
We hear there is some difference between the white 
People and we are all sorry to hear it .... We are all glad 
to hear you desire us to keep in friendship with all white 
men, our friends as we dont want to Concearn in the 
matter but leave you to settle the matter yourselves and 
will be glad to hear the difference settled and all at 
peace again.1s 
A second letter to Stuart on behalf of all the Lower towns 
except the Eutchies and Hitchitas in March of 1776 reaffirmed 
this stance. However, both letters also relayed Creek concerns 
over trade and when it might pick back up. It soon became 
evident to both Stuart and Galphin that whoever could best 
supply the Creeks would gain their affection. Both parties 
promised Upper and Lower towns that supplies would be 
coming and blamed the other when those goods did not arrive. 
The tactics of both men varied. Galphin was opposed to directly 
involving the Indians in the war, and felt it was cruel to both 
the British and Colonials. His goal was to get the Lower towns 
(with whom he carried the most influence) to commit to a 
pledge of neutrality, and knew that that would keep pro-British 
Upper Creeks inactive on the frontier. Stuart did not want to get 
Indians involved in the war and feared for the lives of Tories in 
the backcountry. To offset these concerns, he felt it best to 
1s "Lower Creek Reply to Superintendent Stuart, Declaring 
Neutrality", September 29, 1775, Early American Documents: 
Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789:Volume XII: Georgia and Florida 
Treaties, 1763-1776. 
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hold southern Indians in reserve until they could be used in 
conjunction with British regular forces landing along the coasts 
of Georgia and South Carolina. He also understood that the 
ongoing Choctaw-Creek war kept Upper townsmen from 
committing to a pro-British stance, something that he, and not 
Galphin, had the ability to affect. 
In October, 1776, warriors from the Choctaw nation as 
well as both Upper and Lower Creek towns met with Stuart in 
Pensacola to make peace. Both the Choctaws and Upper Creeks 
strongly pledged allegiance to the English king, while the Lower 
Creeks present grudgingly agreed to protect St. Augustine from 
rebel forces.16 
At the same time, another development kept newly loyal 
warriors out of the conflict for some time. Cherokee families 
trickled in to Upper Creek towns seeking shelter. Not heeding 
the advice of Superintendent Stuart, the Cherokee nation 
quickly jumped into the war under the lead of Dragging Canoe 
in early 1 776. Striking against villages along the frontier, 
Cherokee forces mercilessly killed many white settlers in 
Georgia, North and South Carolina, including both patriots and 
Tories. The Cherokees, however, were unprepared for the 
American resistance put together by the southern colonies. A 
force ranging between 5,000 and 6,000 backwoodsmen soon 
swept through Cherokee country, burning all towns in its path, 
including the principal town of Chote. Cherokee refugees fled 
to the lands southwest and told their Creek hosts of the 
devastation the Americans had brought upon them. Fear of this 
16 David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier: 1540-1783 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 300-301. 
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reprisal would weigh heavily on the minds of Creek warriors 
until the end of the war.17 
The neutralist forces within the Creek confederacy were 
soon undone by the actions of Thomas Fee, the same man who 
had murdered Mad Turkey in 1 774. This time his victim was a 
Coweta warrior. Both Escochabey and lshenpoaphe, two 
respected men who had previously supported neutrality, turned 
against the Americans, along with the dominant town of the 
Lower Creeks, Coweta.1s 
Despite the setback, Galphin doubled his efforts to 
recruit the Creeks to the American cause in 1 777. He held a 
meeting with Handsome Fellow and pro-rebel men from Upper 
towns Okfuskee, Sugatspoges, and Big Tallassee where they 
discussed assassinating Emistiseguo, who was actively 
supporting the British. Galphin and fellow Indian agent Robert 
Rae met a month later with Handsome Fellow, Opeitley Mico, 
the Cussita King, and several hundred warriors. They passed 
out presents in the form of guns, ammunition, and rum and 
invited the Creeks to view the American war effort in 
Charlestown.19 
Galphin's work seemed to be successful. By 1 778, the 
Lower Towns were again firmly in the neutralist camp, even 
Coweta. However, a Coweta raiding party had not received the 
message of Fine Bones which recently declared an end to 
hostilities when they killed three American rangers along the 
17 james H. O'Donnell Ill, "The Southern Indians in the War for 
American Independence, 1 775-1 783," in Four Centuries of 
Southern Indians, ed. Charles M. Hudson (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1 975) 
1s Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 297-298. 
19 Ibid., 305-306. 
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frontier. The flow of American goods into Creek territory 
promptly evaporated.2o 
With no more goods coming from the Americans, john 
Stuart was at ease to make overtures once more to the Creeks. 
The sounds of a reestablished British trade route made them 
quick to listen. Handsome Fellow was not there to counter 
Stuart's supporters; he had died of natural causes on the return 
trip from Charlestown. Neutralist voices within the 
confederation were slowly drowned out in favor of an anti-
American position. They were bolstered by the arrival of 
Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell and his British troops 
near Augusta. A new leader of the Upper Creeks named 
Alexander McGillivray raised a group of warriors to join him. 
With McGillivray rode away all remaining hope of Creek 
neutrality. The people of the swamps and rivers would finish 
the war as allies of the British.21 
It has been argued by some that the Creeks chose the 
"wrong side" of the war. This infers that the Creek nation 
should have allied with the rebels, that the future of the 
Muskogee people would have been somehow better should 
their final allegiance have been with the Americans. The 
inference is unlikely. Americans, boldly empowered after the 
war, snatched lands from friend and foe a!ike.22 
20 Homer Bast, "Creek Indian Affairs, 1 775 1 778," The Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 3 3, no. 1 (March 1 949): 2 3. 
21 Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 317-319. 
22 Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 309-325; Joseph T. Glatthaar 
and James Kirby Martin, Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians 
and the American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 
289-314 
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Instead, it is apparent that the combination of natural 
Creek divisiveness combined with the dueling efforts of john 
Stuart and George Galphin and the early entry of the Cherokees 
into the war (the outcome of which greatly hindered any pan-
Indian attacks on the colonials) ultimately condemned the 
Creeks to their later exodus from the region. Before the war, 
only British authorities had shown interest in restraining the 
wanton desires of frontier land speculators. Only the British 
possessed sufficient supplies that Creek hunters so desperately 
needed. The British also had a government with the intent of 
having good relations with Indian nations. Unable to decisively 
unite against a common enemy, the Creeks relinquished 
control of their post war fates. At the end of the war, the 
Creeks were forced to cede 800 square miles as reparation for 
their role in the conflict. What lands that were not ceded soon 
fell into the laps of American merchants eager to capitalize on 
Muskogee debts. Within fifty years, the Creeks no longer lay 
claim to the river valleys that gave them their name.23 
23 Alden, The South in the Revolution, 360; Corkran, The Creek 
Frontier, 325. 
